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BRETON NATIONALISM AND MODERN FRANCE: 
THE PERMANENT REVOLUTION 
David H. Fortier 
University of Massachusetts 
INTRODUCTION 
In the Paris street riots of May, 1968, Breton students fought 
under the flag of Brittany; the same year at the annual folk festival 
held in Quimper members of a Breton folk-dance group, workers from 
Brest, circulated petitions to the central government calling for a 
restoration of ancient Breton liberties, including the use of the lan-
guage in schools. These were not isolated incidents but part of a 
vigorous nationalist movement that has existed since the nineteenth 
century, and which in its extreme phase demands full independence from 
France and statehood for a population of over three million. 
This paper is concerned with the dynamics of modern Breton nation-
alism; its origin and development from the formal inauguration of the 
movement in the late nineteenth century to the present day. Working 
solely with documentary sourcesl and following the approach of Thrupp 
(1970) and Wolf (1969) I have utilized the case history method to 
cover the background and circumstances out of which the movement grew, 
the nature of its ideology and leadership, and its developmental career. 
Three stages will be followed. The first step will be to investigate 
the impact of techno-economic change on the genesis of nationalism. 
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The second step vill be to examine characteristic forms of nationalist 
ideology, leadership and organization. The third step will be to trace 
the development of specific organizations in relationship to other 
forms o f institutional change. 
TECHNO-ECONOMIC CHANGE ON THE REGIONAL LEVEL 
The Ecosystem Prior to Change 
As a geographic region Brittany"s dominant characteristic is its 
physical isolation from the rest of France. This factor explains in 
part both the failure of national integration and the resulting per-
sistence and maintenance of strong regional cultural traditions until 
the turn of the present century. Looking like a great thumb projecting 
into the Atlantic Ocean from the fist of France, Brittany's seaward 
orientation was a characteristic feature from the time of early settle-
ment. Only a short sailing distance from Britain, it became the refuge 
of Brythonic Celts fleeing from the Anglo-Saxon invasions of the sixth 
century A.D. Successive immigrating Celtic populations settled them-
selves along a ragge d coastline indented with natural harbors, develop-
ing an economy based on fishing and agriculture. The interior, an 
undulating plateau of forest and moorland, here and there broken by 
rocky headlands and cut by swift rivers, remained remote and inaccess-
ible. For centuries cultivation remained fixed within a zone seldom 
more than six kilometers from the coastline. 
Until the late nineteenth century, when the Second Agricultural 
Revolution brought profound changes in technology, the Breton peasant 
economy was stabili zed on the basis of small-scale grain farming, 
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primitive tools and hand labor, an ecotype Wolf refers to as paleotechnic 
(1966:19). Soil deficiencies and the scarcity of arable land acted as 
further checks on agricultural producti vi ty and such surpluses as could 
be produced were sufficient only to maintain a small-scale feudal order 
in which the landowner-nobility were scarcely better off than the tenant-
peasant. Under such conditions a system of share-tenancy (metayage), 
became the dominant form of tenure. The latter half of the nineteenth 
century found Brittany a rural backwater, remote in space and time from 
the economic changes that had begun fifty years earlier to transform the 
rest of France. There were few other regions in the nation that had re-
tained so much the earmarks of the ancien . regime. 
Peasant communities were small and isolated from each other. Socio-
economic relationships were still based on a de facto feudal order; 
share-tenancy and cash-tenancy were the dominant forms of peasant tenure. 
Population growth had been slow but had long since outstripped available 
land, and the peasant custom of partible inheritance had brought about 
excessive fragmentation of land holdings. Pressure on the land had only 
one escape-valve: emigration. The drift to towns and cities increased 
sharply in the la.st half of the ninete~nth century: where 8,000 Bretons 
had left the region in the period 1831-1851, 116,000 departed between 
1851-1872 (Delumeau 1969:466). Emigration thus balancing population in-
crease, a low tolerable man-land ration was maintained. While barely 
provided with a living, the peasant was nevertheless subject to few of the 
pri vations suffered by his brethren in oth~r.: parts of Europe at that time. 
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The last two decades of the ninet~enth century saw the beginning 
of a radical transformation in the Breton economy and regional culture 
brought about primarily as a result of the Second Agricultural Revolu-
tion. The results of these changes were to have a precipitating effect 
on the rise of nationalistic organizations and the shaping of a nation-
alistic ideology. 
The Causes of Change 
The Second Agricultural Revolution emerging along with the Indus-
trial Revolution drew from a common pool of scientific experimentation 
and knowledge. Major innovations in the field of agriculture included 
techniques of crop rotation, the use of chemical fertilizers, new crop 
types, and improved farm machinery. Although these innovations had been 
slowly transforming agriculture in other regions of France as far back 
as the late eighteenth century, they were slow to reach Brittany. The 
factors of physical isolation and cultural conservatism certainly opera-
ted as major barriers; it was not until about 1880 that the transforma-
tion began, primarily through the medium of newly established farmers' 
syndicates. 
The agrarian syndicalist movement which did so much to break down 
peasant conservatism was sponsored not by peasants but by innovators 
from the landed aristocracy and bourgeoisie. Inspired by the Social 
Catholic ideology of the times, explicit in such writings as those of 
the sociologist Frederic Le Play, the sponsors of agrarian reform saw 
in the formation of syndicates a method of reaching the ears and mind 
of the peasant, and a means of effecting socio-economic change in rural 
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society. Encouraged by a bill passed by Parliament in 1884 legalizing 
such groups, large landowners in Brittany began setting up local syndi-
cates, later to be uni ted in a powerful regional structure ~ and federated 
in 1886 as the Union Centrale des Syndicats des Agriculteurs de France 
(UCSAF). Although agricultural syndicates were open to all strata of 
rural society, from large landlords to share-tenants and farm laborers, 
leadership and control remained in the hands of a paternalistic landed 
. t 2 arlS ocracy. 
The agrarian syndicalist movement was given further impetus by 
counter-moves to establish rival organizations. Republican leaders, 
again, not peasants but town dwellers with a sense of mission, set up 
their own versions of syndi cates. Called cooperatives (or mutuelles), 
the emphasis was economic rather than social or moral, and among other 
things provided farm credit and insurance. 
A radical phase of the syndicalist movement emerged in the last 
years of the nineteenth century. Dissatisfied with the conservative 
doctrines of the Social Catholics, militant priests organized a 
splinter group known as the Christian Democrats. In Brittany, the new 
faction was led by Felix Trochur, a young Breton priest who preached 
activism and emancipation, and was instrumental in establishing a net-
work of syndicates along with insurance and credit societies. 
Despite the divergences in m.oti vation and viewpoint, the factions 
within the agrarian syndicalist movement were united in a common goal: 
to increase the productivity of the peasant and, by marketing surplus 
commodities, to make small-seale farming a profitable enterprise. In 
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the last two decades of the nineteenth century the desired changes were 
effected in most of rural Brittany. The use of new · equipment, new cul-
tivation methods, and chemical fertilizers made possible both an 
extension and intensification of cultivation. An innovation in plow 
design spurred a trend toward massive land clearing, opening up the in-
terior moorland~ once used only for sheep pasturage. The introduction 
of new forage crops now permitted the raising of horses, cows and pigs. 
Rye, the traditional grain staple, was replaced by wheat and new types 
of vegetables that found a ready local market. 
Although mixed farming tended to remain the basis of Breton agri-
culture, a shift to market gardening occurred in areas along the coast 
where milder microclimates favored early vegetables. The building of 
a railway line in 1880 linking coastal Brittany to Paris further 
accelerated the trend toward cash-cropping and in a number of areas 
canneries were established to handle surplus commodities. By the turn 
of the century agriculture had been transformed into an economic enter-
prise that aimed at maximum production and maximal profits in a com-
petitive market system on both a regional and national level. Whether 
the peasant sold milk and butter or surplus wheat locally, or produced 
peas and artichokes for sale in Paris, his involvement in the world of 
the marketplace entailed a major shift to a new way of life in which 
the self-subsistent quasi-feudal isolation of the past was replaced by 
an emergent awareness of his integration within a regional and national 
politico-economic system. 
The railway line that opened up Brittany to national and world 
markets spurred the development of another sector of the regional 
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economy, the fishing industry. Prior to the construction of the railway 
line in 1880 fishing was scaled to the needs of the local market. With 
the develop~ent of fast transportation fish hauls could be shipped to 
meet the demands of the Paris market. Fishing rapidly became commercial-
ized; fleets increased in size becoming highly specialized, particularly 
in deep-sea fishing for cod and tuna, and off-shore fishing for sardines. 
In turn the development of ship-building and the construction of local 
canneries changed fishing villages into small-scale commercial ports. 
The Ramifications of Techno-Economic Change 
Thus at the turn of the century major techno~economic changes in 
rural and maritime Brittany had brought to an isolated, self-sufficient, 
but poverty-ridden population the bright promise of '~modernization" 
with its attendant benefits. But the results of these changes within 
the next two decades of the twentieth century were largely negative. 
Demographic expansion checked the gains from increased agricultural 
productivity, and entry into a competitive world market rendered the 
Breton fishing economy highly vulnerable to price fluctuations. The 
eventual decline in the economy coupled with a growing realization of 
Brittany's peripheral position with regard to the center of economic and 
political control in Paris, created a favorable breeding-ground for in-
cipient nationalism. Let us examine these factors in some detail. 
Increased productivity, one of the prime effects of neo-technic 
agriculture, served not only to tie the peasant to the local market, but 
substantially enlarged his food supply and improved his diet. The result 
was an expansion in family size creating a significant surge in population 
growth out of proportion to available arable land. The drift from rural 
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areas to local towns and citi~s wag acc818rated, but because urban 
areas were limited in size and number with small-scale industries 
that could only absorb limited labor, the result was simply to in-
crease the number of unemployed. The alternative was massive 
migration from the region: between 1891-1911 the exodus increased 
to 206,000 compared with 126,000 from 1872-1891 (Delumeau 1969:466). 
The inability of the Breton economy to keep pace with population 
was becoming increasingly evident. 
The decline of the highly specialized fishing industry further 
added to a sense of crisis. In the fast expanding competitive mar-
ket of commercial fishing, Brittany soon fell behind. The important 
sardine industry was first struck. An oversupply in conjunction 
with heavy competition from foreign trawler fleets brought a collapse 
in prices. Conflict was generated internally: fishermen disputed 
with canneries over prices, factory workers were at odds with bosses, 
and fisherman undercut fisherman (Delumeau 1969:473-5). About the 
same time deep-sea fishing was declining for the same reasons. Com-
petition from foreign mechanized fleets and the invasion of European 
markets by cheaper products each year reduced the number of ships 
leaving Breton ports. By the beginning of World War I fleets had 
dwindled, ports were at a standstill, and unemployment was widespread. 
The War itself effectively brought to an end what had been for over 
three decades Brittany's major economic enterprise. 
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THE EMERGENCE OF BRETON NATIONALISM 
Incipient Nationalism at the Turn of the Century 
Against this background of increasing economic and social disloca-
tion in the pre-World War I period, there crystallized a growing sense 
of estrangement from the centralized bureaucracy in Paris whose inaction 
in the face of the crisis was interpreted as disinterest in Brittany's 
special problems. The movement of protest against economic competitors 
took on a nationalist coloring with the establishment of the Union 
Regionaliste Bretonne (URB) in 1898. Moderate in its ideology, the URB 
phrased its economic demands in terms of a regional nationalism that had 
been latent ever since the French Revolution had revoked Brittany's 
political autonomy. 
Through the nineteenth century a small but dedicated intellectual 
elitist group had kept alive a consciousness of a distinctive Breton 
heritage and history: the Celtic language and cultural ties; the centuries 
of independence which ended in 1532 when, as a result of a royal marriage 
the Duchy of Brittany became a part of France; the concession of regional 
autonomy, with a separate and sovereign assembly until 1789 when these 
rights were annulled by the Jacobins; the suppression of Breton language 
and culture; the revolt of General Cadoudal who led the Breton armies 
against Napoleon in 1804 and was subsequently defeated and beheaded. 
Elitist groups, predominantly drawn from the monarchist upper class, 
attempted to maintain a concerted front through the Association Bretonne, 
founded in 1801, whose principal aim was the restoration of pre-Jacobin 
political liberties. The association was soon suppressed by the govern-
ment, but formed again in 1843, only to be banned in 1863. 
Attempts to pre$erve the Breton language and distinctive cultural 
traditions were also part of the latent nationalism of the nineteenth 
century. Poets and writers were active in the creation of a vernacular 
literature in the romantic tradition. In 1870 a petition to permit the 
teaching of Breton in schools was addressed to the government ,but was 
turned down. 
Among the peasantry there was also a late nirieteenth cent.ury revival 
of interest in the traditional culture, coincident with other changes 
triggered by the Second Agricultural Revolution. Increased income was 
channeled into conspicuous consumption. Highly decorative and costly 
costumes of a distinct Breton style appeared, along with carved, ornate 
furniture and indigenous architectural styles. Traditional dances and 
music were revived in keeping with the elaboration of festivals and 
ceremonies in both social and religious life. 
From the various themes of this incipient nationalism--more a col-
lective sentiment than a movement--the URB created an ideology that wove 
together the myth of a past cultural order with its sense of ethnic 
distinction, and a program of economic and political reform. It called 
for the teaching of Breton in the school system, a recognition of former 
Breton rights by an increase in regional representation at the parlia-
mentary level, greater attention to the development of untapped economic 
resources, and the alleviation of the economic crisis in ports and towns. 
Although ineffective against the intransigent central government, the URB 
was instrumental in establishing a model for future nationalist associa-
tions. From this point on, the goal of establishing a new economic order 
was inseparable from the recreation of the past-..... the golden age of poli.,.. 
tical freedom and cultural and linguistic autonomy. 
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The Proliferation of Nationalist Organizations Prior to World War I 
In the period of economic crisis prior to the First World War the 
nationalist movement expanded rapidly with a proliferation of associa-
tions and the appearance of a number of periodicals attempting to foster 
a distinctive "Breton consciousness." A Catholic association founded in 
1905 by a liberal priest, Abbe Perrot, was dedicated to the revival of 
the language and traditional culture, symbolically taking for its name 
the Breton term Bleun-Brug (Heath Flower). Although professing not to 
be concerned with political goals , Abbe Perrot took a firm regionalist 
position with respect to ~ restoration of former rights as the only means 
of pressuring for economic and social reform. Bleun-Brug was particular-
ly effective in supporting and accelerating the revival of traditional 
Breton music, songs, dances and costumes, organizing regional festivals, 
and sponsoring language classes for young people. At the same time, the 
intellectual elite at the forefront of the movement were attempting to 
reach all segments of the public through periodicals, newspapers and 
reviews. Over a dozen periodicals, some exclusively in Breton, appeared 
during the pre-war era, a few polemical in nature but all dedicated to 
reviving a sense of ethnicity along with the need for coupling economic 
reform with political and cultural freedom. To all nationalists, the 
Breton language became the symbol of the new ideology. Petitions to per-
mit the teaching of the language were sent yearly to Paris between 
1905-1911, but were greeted by silence. 
The movement entered a separatist phase in 1911 with the establish-
ment of the first Breton nationalist party (Strollad Broadel Breiz). 
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Two agpectg differentiated the organization from the URB. The new 
party was led by a small group of young liberal writers and journal-
ists who espoused political activism in contrast, to the URB's con-
servative and pacifist program. Furthermore, the basic tenet of the 
party platform was the complete severance of ties with France and the 
creation of a sovereign nation. It was a stride beyond the URB's 
cautious plea for a restoration of regional rights. To further cir-
culate this demand an official party organ, Breiz Dishual (Free 
Brittany), was founded; its rallying cry was "Brittany for the Bretons." 
Within its pages appeared one of the strongest denunciations of the 
French government yet heard. Speaking of French "oppression" since 
the treaty of 1532, it cited the gradual attrition of liberties, the 
loss of language , customs, civil and religious traditions that con-
'sti tuted the former national patrimony; it spoke of the refusal to 
assimilate to French culture' in terms of the ability of "the Breton 
soul" to survive and resist all efforts to crush and annihilate it. 
Likening Brittany to enslaved Ireland and Poland, the party called for 
independence and nationhood, with the use of its own flag, its own 
language and national hymns (Barbin 1937:114-115). 
Although the militancy of the nationalist party was eclipsed a 
few years later by the outbreak of the war, the pattern of political 
action in the name of nationalism was set as a model to be resurrected 
in a new guise at a later date. 
88 
THE DEVELOPMENTAL CAREER OF NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS 
The Resurgence of Nationalism and the Rise of Factionalism 
While the disruption of four years o.f war brought an end to specific 
organizations and the diverse p~blications supporting Breton nationalist 
goals, some evidence of the movement's viability was revealed at the 
Peace Conference in 1919. Phrasing the aspirations of Breton separatists 
in terms of the Wilsonian principle of self-determination, a petition was 
presented to President Wilson and the conference members calling for 
national sovereignty in the name of Brittany's former independence. The 
petition was signed by 800 notables: deputies, senators, general council-
lors and the five Breton bishops. 
The following years saw the inauguration of a series of new period-
icals and reviews dedicated to a revival of the nationalist movement. 
One journal, Breiz Atao, (Brittany Forever) is considered the most in-
fluential (Barbin 1937:127ff). Like a phoenix rising from the ashes, it 
embodied the resurrection of the polemic, the spirit and fervor of the 
pre-war publications. In French and Breton it addressed itself specific-
ally to the leading economic problems of the post-war decade, linking the 
only hope for economic development with political independence from France. 
Pointing to the recently gained freedom of the Czechs, Bulgars and Poles, 
it stated that "the incapacity of the French state machine, the inactivity 
of the French people faced with the profound crisis of our epoch, force 
us to look to ourselves to find a solution for our economic problems" 
quoted in Bolitho 1924:248). Chief among the issues pinpointed by Breiz 
Atao were the increased exodus from the farms, the neglected ports and 
urban unemployment. Calling attention to the disparity between taxes 
paid out and government spending for the region, economic salvation was 
89 
viewed in terms o f autonomy: utilization of regional revenues for self-
development; the creation of industry ; rehabilitation of the ports; and 
revitalization of a farming econ omy undermined by unfavorable market 
conditions. 
Through the twenties Breiz Atao remained the principal voice of the 
nationalist movement. Although at first a quarto review, it was later 
to become the official organ of a formal party organization. Support-
ers of the movement held annual congresses to discuss policy and its 
implementation; at the Congress held in 1927 the decision to form a 
nationalist party was announced. 3 Le Parti Autonomiste Breton (PAB) 
was officially founded a few months later. 
Internal dissension soon arose over the issue of separatism and 
nationhood versus federalism. The concept of a European federation 
was gaining aili~erents among bther national minority groups. Some 
Breton nationalists saw distinct advantages to be gained not only in the 
structure of federation but in allying the new party with similar pol-
itical organizations representing minority groups in other areas of 
Europe. Eventually those favoring federalism over separation emerged 
in control of the new party, with Breiz Atao the official party jour-
nal. Factionalism continued, however, and combined with financial dif-
ficulties effectively undermined party organization. In 1931 the 
separatists regained leadership of the movement refor,mingin the name 
of a new party, the Parti National Breton (PNB). 
Although its goals were designed to be realized through legitimate 
political channels, neither the PAB nor the PNB fained enough popular 
support to carry through a successful electoral campaign. Schism wi thin 
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the ranks of the nationalist leaders, even after the emergence of the 
PNB, continued to weaken the effectiveness of the nationalist movement 
as a totality. 
The need to awaken the public of Brittany, and France as well, to 
the urgency of the Breton problem set the course of the PNB through 
the Great Depression of the thirties. The party launched a vigorous 
propaganda campaign through Breiz Atao, combined with non-violent demon-
strations at government-sponsored ceremonies and on occasions of visits 
by French government officials. 
Coincident with the emergence of PNB's program of a "politics of 
force" was the opening phase of a new "politics of violence." Modeled 
after the Irish Sinn Fein, a secret association formed calling itself 
Gwenn Ha Du (White and Black) after the colors of the Breton flag. 
Echoing the PNB's program of achieving economic, cultural and linguistic 
reforms through independence, it began a series of violent demonstra-
tions against the central government. One of the initial acts, in 
1932, was the blowing up of a statue in Rennes commemorating the union 
of Brittany with France at the very moment the French Premier was 
attending the celebration of the 400th anniversary of that union in 
another Breton city. Dur.ing the next few years there were numerous 
acts of terrorism such as the bombing of administrative buildings in 
various towns and cities of the region. Less militant separatists, 
although overtly disavowing the Gwenn Ha Du, realized its value. One 
writer, while admitting it was a terrorist organization, claimed it 
had nevertheless struck a forceful blow for the cause and had served 
to whip up the energies of the otherwise apathetic Breton (Barbin 
1937:141-145). 
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The demonstrations also had the effect of reinforcing the .French 
government's negative attitude toward the Breton nationalist movement 
and its demands, at the same time alerting Paris to the need for a con-
frontatio:n with the activists. 
While the separatists remained divided over the degree of extremism 
necessary to achieve their goals, there was implicit agreement that poli-
tical action had to be taken outside of legitimate channels. Opposed to 
this new point were the regionalists whose pacifism, conservatism and 
belief in moderate legitimate courses of action branded them as the re-
actionaries of the movement. Some of these associations were among the 
pioneers of the movement; the Catholic Breun-Blug, the URB, Association 
Bretonne; others like the Gorsedd of Bards although supporting Breton 
claims had been essentially apolitical. 4 In 1936 these associations 
combined in a Front Breton to formulate a program for political, eco-
nomic and cultural reforms under a regional scheme. Forty-one candidates 
at the general elections agreed to accept the program and fifteen were 
elected. 
While .the regionalist view achieved some temporary political re-
presentation these successes were not followed by any action on the part 
of the government to meet even moderate demands. In response, the 
separatists accelerated their anti-government propaganda and demonstra-
tions. Finally, in 1939 the government officially dissolved the PNB and 
banned its newspaper. Two of its leaders who had escaped to Germany 
were condemned to death in absentia; others were imprisoned. 
The exiled leaders in Germany appealed to that government to support 
their demand for independence, and apparently were assured by high 
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officials that a Breton state would be set up at the end of the war 
(Ellis 1968:188). 
After the invasion of France and its subsequent defeat in 1940) 
Breton nationalists looked to the German conquerors for support. The 
separatist faction reemerged--from exile and prison--and a new organ-
ization Cortseil National Breton was formed to implement the program lead-
ing to eventual autonomy. The Parti National Breton was resurrected and 
the official party newspaper given a symbolic title L'heure bretonne. 
But their demands for complete autonomy and their violent anti-Vichy 
stand brought about several adverse reactions. The Vichy government 
pressured the German administration to take active measures against the 
Breton nationalists. Although no repressive action was taken, German 
support of extremist nationalist goals weakened and a shift was made in-
stead to the more moderate demands of the regionalists. Accordingly, in 
1941, the Breton language and history were admitted as subjects within 
the schools, radio broadcasts in Breton were authorized, and a Celtic in-
stitute was set up to coordinate the cultural societies dedicated to 
research on the Breton intellectual and artistic heritage. The region-
alists were also instrumental in setting up a Comite Consultatif de 
Bretagne which was modeled after the pre-revolutionary Parlement de Bretagne, 
but failed ito obtain an official status. 
The concessions granted to the regionalists, while minimal, served 
to antagonize the French and widen the breach between the Bretons and 
French, eventually leading to open conflict. The Vichy government regard-
ed the new-found gains as evidence of an anti-French secessionist plot. 
Some members of the maquis, the French resistance movement, apparently 
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linking nationalist gains with pro-German collaborators~ began~ in 
1943, a campaign of assassination against Bretons who belonged to any 
nationalist group, whether political or cultural in emphasis. 
The climax of the anti-Breton campaign came with the urder of 
the founder of Bleun-Brug, Abbe Perrot, the pioneer and symbol of the 
nationalist movement. The effect was to shift many "neutral" Bretons 
into open opposition to the French Resistance. A radical splinter 
group from the PNB organized a military unit, the Formation Jean-Marie 
Perrot, to oppose the maquis, and aligning themselves with the Germans 
accepted German arms and uniforms. For the remainder of the war the 
internecine conflict continued, a symbolic demonstration of the widen-
ing gap that separated Breton goals and French determination to oppose 
them. 
The French view that the Perrot unit typified Breton pro-German and 
anti-French activities led directly, in the post war period, to the 
severe suppression of all aspects of nationalism. After the Liberation 
the concessions allowed by the Germans were withdrawn and the language 
banned; arrest warrants were issued for anyone connected with any Breton 
society or association , irrespective of political orientation. Sentences 
of banishment, confiscation of property and loss of civil rights were 
passed. A number of Bretons were imprisoned; some leaders escaped to 
Ireland, fifteen were executed in 1946. 
The result of this punitive action was to strengthen the base of 
the movement rather than weaken it. From this base a fresh growth of 
nationalist associations soom emerged expressing at first cultural rather 
than political or economic goals. Brittany's failure to recover from the 
post-war economic slump soon directed attention to the need for action, 
and economic demands came once more to the fore of nationalist programs. 
~ne Post-War Economic Crisis 
The decade following the Liberation was marked by general economic 
stagnation in both rural and urban sectors of Brittany. A war-time 
shift from commercial cash-cropping to a base of mixed farming and 
self-subsistence had now to be reversed. But past experience with un-
stable prices tended to produce a conservative reaction--diversified 
farming once revived was sustained as a hedge against market fluctua-
tions and rising food prices, even at the risk of income loss and a 
lowered standard of living (Morin 1970:52). The exodus from farm to 
towns and cities began again. Urban areas, however, had suffered wide-
spread, and in some cases, total destruction during the invasion, and 
reconstruction was lagging. An already atrophied industrial sector 
was unable to provide necessary employment for the growing population. 
In 1947-50 major strikes and demonstrations broke out among shipyard 
workers in two of Brittany's major ports, St. Nazaire and Brest. 
Beginning in 1948, while other areas of France entered a period 
of growth and expansion, regions such as Brittany, particularly the 
more isolated western area (Finistere) continued in a state of stag-
nation and decline. Between 1954 and 1962 the number of farmers 
fell by 25 percent, and that of fishermen by 20 percent. The scarcity 
of jobs caused by population surplus and social mobility intensified 
migration: 2,500 young people were leaving Sud-Finistere annually. 
The signs of demographic imbalance were evident after 1950, and the 
declining ratio of young people in the total population compared un-
favorably with the national average (Morin 1970:49ff). 
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Thoge who remained~Ma new generation of farmers-~were instrumen~ 
tal in breaking away from the pattern of mixed farming. The period 
from 1950 to the late ' 60s saw a transformation paralleling the Second 
Agricultural Revolution of the late nineteenth century, a shift to 
commercial specialized crops, but with improved technology. Just as 
the new plow marked a major innovation in the past, the tractor now 
became the craze. Rapid mechanization was stimulated both by the 
government's stress on expansion and productivity and the availability 
of credit from farm syndicates. But, as Wright points out , mechaniza-
tion was not always the solution to the peasant problem and often had 
uneconomic conse~uences: one was a heavy burden of peasant indebtedness 
and another was the unprofitable attempt to mechanize too small a farm 
(Wright 1964:145). 
And, too, the modernization of agriculture was more than a matter 
of change in technology. On the distribution side, the marketing sys-
tem had changed little in fifty years. An archaic transportation system, 
the long distance to the Paris market in combination with competitive 
pricing from more favored regions often created a situation of feast or 
famine. The government's slowness to take more than minimal action to 
regulate the anarchy of market pricing finally produced a violent re-
action from Breton commercial farmers. 5 
Beginning with the "artichoke revolution" of 1960 and continuing 
into 1961, farmers began a series of mass demonstrations in market gar-
den areas climaxing in the jac~uerie of June, 1961. 6 At that point some 
4,000 farmers on tractors, protesting a sharp drop in commodity prices, 
jammed the highway leading to the market town of Morlaix. The leaders 
were young syndicalists whose later arrest triggered almost two weeks of 
rural insurrection. 
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The Response: the Renascence of the Nationalist Movement 
The worsening economic crisis again brought to the forefront the 
latent forces of the nationalist movement. Fragmented groups, their 
organizat ions officially dissolved in the post-war reprisals, began to 
draw together after 1950 under the unofficial designation of Comite 
d'Etudes et de Liaison des Interets Breton (CELIB).1 Its principal 
goal was to facilitate regional economic development and expansion 
through merging various economic, occupational and cultural groups in 
a united front, a r egional pressure group which would draw up and pre-
sent programs of economic reform to the government . Although its aims 
were primarily economic, the structure of CELIB included a cultural 
comndssion concerned with winning official recognition. 
Avowedly apolitical, it was nevertheless a reformation of pre-war 
conservative regionalist groups, and as such was opposed by the more 
politically active separatists, who viewed the solution of economic 
problems as possible only wi thin the context of political action and 
cultural autonomy. A schism also deve loped within the CELIB between 
those who wished to remain politically neutral and those who favored 
seeking left-wing support. 
Despite its official recognition as an advisory group by the 
government in 1961, some eight years later it had still been unable to 
achieve any of its goals in Parliament. As the failure of the CELIB 
became evident the initial reservation of anti-regionalist critics 
seemed justified. Counter-moves to create alternative programs brought 
a proliferation of nationalist associations , which while sharing common 
goals, differed in emphasis and means of achievement. Two types emerged, 
97 
in most cases reflecting continuity with patterns or in some cases 
actual organizations established in the pre-war period: those with 
a strong politico-economic bias and the cultural organizations that 
stressed language reform and the revival of Breton dance, music and 
the arts. Those inclined to political action included, in the order 
of their founding: Le Mouvement pour l'Organisation de la Bretagne 
(MOB), Union Democratique Bretonne (UDB) , Front pour la Liberation 
de Bretagne (FLB) , Sav Breizh. 
An early opponent of the CELIB policy of qualified regionalism, 
the MOB was founded in 1951 in the tradition of the pre-war federal-
ists. Its program outlined the evolution of Brittany toward internal 
federalism within the French state. But because of de Gaulle's in-
transigence it later shifted its line in favor of independence from 
France and incorporation within a European federal state (Ellis 1968: 
192). Led by a militant intellectual, Yann Fouere, a platform of 
political, economic and cultural demands was announced with the 
familiar emotional overtones of pre-war appeals: "The spirit of the 
Breton political movement is decapitated--we must give it a head, a 
spirit, a goal, a flame, a hope, a will." The appeal to young mili-
tants was a strong one, and it is chiefly this group that has respond-
ed. Caerleon, historian of the nationalist movement, states that the 
MOB became categorized in time as extremist and has failed to capture 
wide-spread popular support (1969:50ff). 
To represent the more conservative element, the UDB was formed 
in 1963, calling for a special regional assembly with effective auto-
nomy in economic and cultural affairs. Though regionalist in aims, 
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it distinguished itself from CELIB by its emphasis on direct political 
action through the polls. 
The FLB was the extremist reaction to the failure of legitimate 
channels of protest. Modeling itself on the pre-war terrorist Gwenn 
Ha Du, it began in 1966 to conduct a campaign of violence and for the 
next two years set off explosions in police stations and prefectures 
and other administrative buildings symbolic of centralized authority. 
Since 1969, after a number of arrests, the FLB has suspended its acti-
vities. The ideology of the FLB reflected sophisticated awareness of 
the ideological currents of the time. With reference to Algeria, key 
slogans compared the "colonial status" of Brittany and spoke of the need 
to "decolonize" the region (Caerleon 1969:141). As in the case of the 
Gwenn Ha Du, the FLB and its activities were officially disclaimed by 
other nationalist groups but a statement by the politician and writer 
Rene Pleven makes a telling point: "The publi c powers can stop attempts 
of the agitators most efficiently by announcing a plan of sweeping 
action. Obvious economic difficulties of the region aid the agitators 
to find cooperation in the population" (quoted in Caerleon 1969 :171). 
The most recent group to form, the Sav Breizh, is a youth movement 
generated by the events of the nation-wide so-called "cultural revolution" 
of May-June, 1968. During the fighting in the Paris streets, young Bretons 
carried their Black and White flag along with representatives of other 
French minority groups, the Occitans (of Languedoc) and Corsicans, among 
others. The Breton program, socialist in leaning, consisted of a blend 
of tradition and innovation; they demanded self-government for the Bretons 
with the aim of alleviating underdevelopment, protecting the traditional 
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culture and restoring the language. Their points included opposition 
to the common market, a moratorium on farmers' and workers' debts, agri-
cultural cooperatives, and an affirmation of solidarity with all other 
oppre ssed minority groups, including the Blacks in North America and the 
Indians in South America (Caerleon 1969 : 204ff) . 
The post-war revival of the cultural movement is marked by an em-
phas is on youth organizations as the new vehicles to carry Breton nation-
alistic ideals. In addition to the reestablishment in 1948 of Bleun-
Brug, which, as in the past addressed it s program of cultural revival 
8 to Catholic youth , a number of local folklorigue societies were founded, 
the Cercles Celtiques. These were concerned with traditional Breton 
history, folklore, dance and music. In 1950 a grand confederation of 
these and similar organizations was founded under the name of Kendalc'h 
At first Kendalc'h along with other cultural societies, was apolitical, 
although implicitly backing nationalist political and economic goals. 
However, an eventual decision was made to make an open avowal of poli-
tical support. Along with the Association de Sonneurs (association of 
Breton musicians) the decision was made to abandon a policy limited to 
cultural revival and "engage in combat for Brittany with all our force" 
(Caerleon 1969:224). 
Today the nationalist movement is decentralized and acephalous. 
Factionalism exists, based primarily on the question of what strategies 
to employ and what goals have priority. Yet according to a leader of 
the MOB, there is a concensus among the various sectors of the move-
ment--economic, political and cultural--as to the goals themselves, 
strongly reinforced by a sense of unity based on a distinctive ethnic 
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and linguistic tradition and a well-defined territory (Mainwaring 1969). 
In opposition to what is viewed as the common enemy, the government of 
France, Breton nationalists have sought support from, and in turn have 
supported, other French minority groups: Alsatians, Basques, and the 
Occitans of Languedoc (Caerleon 1969:62). P~~-Celtic links are firmly 
forged, and both cultural and political ties are maintained, particularly 
wi th Wales whose own separatists openly back the Breton quest for in-
dependence. 
In 1969 separatist leaders in Brittany entertained a growing ex-
pectation that ,the government would make some real concessions to Breton 
demands. Alan AI Louarn, representing the MOB, in an interview speaks 
of preparing for a Breton state; of a shadow cabinet which covers all 
administrative structures and is ready to take over responsibility for 
the Breton community when the moment arrives (Mainwaring 1969:230). 
Until that moment, as Caerleon has put it, Brittany is a country in 
"a permanent state of revolution" (Caerleon 1969). 
CONCLUSIONS 
I have attempted to outline in this case history the various phases 
in the development of the Breton nationalist movement with the aim of 
generating hypotheses or tentative generalizations useful for a compara-
tive study of nationalism among other minority groups. The first step 
was to establish the basic causes which catalyzed the movement and kept 
it viable. The second was to examine the characteristic forms of ideo-
logy and organizational patterns of the various sectors of the movement. 
The third was to trace the development and internal changes in the 
movement through the present day. 
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With respect to causality, a fundamental distinction must be made 
between two types of nationalism; between that which existed wi thin the 
major span of the nineteenth century, and that altered form which arose 
around the turn of the century . The distinction corresponds to what has 
been called "antiQuarian" nationalism versus "modern" nationalism 
(Symmons-Symonolewicz 1970) . The former, appearing in the early nine-
teenth century,was a response to the loss of Breton political and cul-
tural liberties at the time of the formation of the Jacobian state. In 
nature it was a passive reaction restricted in social scope to the 
aristocracy whose power had been stripped and whose social order was 
threatened by republicanism, and to the literati who sought in the 
romantic tradition to revive and preserve a mythic past. 
Modern Breton nationalism appears to have emerged as a response to 
the dislocations caused by rapid economic and social change. Brittany's 
late entry into the world market system forced a rapid development in 
the rural and maritime economy. An improved transport system linked a 
peripheral region with metropolitan markets, and commercialization and 
specialization in agriculture and fishing followed. Exposure to the 
anarchy of the market soon affected farmer and fisherman alike. Con-
tracting markets combined with an expanding population brought on an 
economic crisis that continued until the beginning of World War I. 
As Wolf (1969 :282) has noted, "paradoxically, the very spread of 
the capitalist market principle also forced men to seek defenses 
against it. They could meet this end either by cleaving to their trad-
itional institutions, increasingly subverted by the forces which they 
were trying to neutralize; or they could commit themselves to the 
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search for new social forms which would grant them shelter" Breton 
nationalist organizations erected their defenses by attempting both--
to search for new forms, but in the name of the traditional past. Ideo-
logical platforms varied in the stress placed on the past or future. 
Based on these criteria of ideology, two types of nationalist or-
ganizations emerged: a "cultural" type seeking reform in terms of the 
past ,and a "political" type primarily future-oriented. Cultural organ-
izations like the Catholic Bleun-Brug viewed social and economic reform 
in terms of a return to a former golden age--andthe revival of the 
status quo with its fixed social order of nobility, clergy and peasant. 
Accordingly, ethnic and linguistic insularity were strongly emphasized. 
Leadership was passive, conservative and to the right of regional and 
national politics. Political organizations stressed economic reform in 
terms ·of increased development of regional resources--essentially a pro-
gram of modernization but to be achieved through a return.to the political 
autonorrw of the past. The ins istence on language revival provides the 
unifying symbol of continuity linking past and future. 
The dynamics of development and change in nationalist organizations 
shows certain parallels with the process of revitalization as analyzed by 
Wallace (1970:191ff). With some modifications because of the secular 
nature of nationalism, Wallace's stages can be used as a model for under-
standing the phenomenon of Breton nationalism. 
Stage 1: " formulation of a code." This stage is characteri zed by a 
reaction to cultural distortion in which the existing culture is 
contrasted with the goal culture (past or future). A program of 
demands is set forth and a small group of leaders form the nucleus 
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of an organization. The program may take on the attributes of an 
incipient association or political party, but a formal organization 
or administrative structure is merely blue-printed. 
Stage 2: "communication." Breton nationalist associations are in-
volved in two kinds of communication: petition and appeal to the 
central government, and the dissemination of the code in order to 
attract local support. Frequently, messages are aimed at special 
interest groups such as workers, peasants, youth, and Catholics. 
The media most frequently used are periodicals. 
Stage 3: "organization." The gradual expansion in the number of 
followers and the development of a formal administrative structure 
probably takes place at this stage. The holding of annual party 
congresses implies both followers and a formal structure. A 
number of parallel organizations may be present differing in code 
and appeal to various groups and components, the basic distinction 
being between organizations that stress political goals and those 
that emphasize cultural revitalization. 
Stage 4: "adaptation." At this stage there occur reformulations 
in code and strategy shifts in leadership. In any given organiza-
tion factionalism develops over code strategy and leadership 
issues which may result in open breaks and even lead to the dis-
solution of the organization or its fission into a number of dif-
ferent bodies. In the Breton case, this stage is reached when 
economic stress is heightened and demands and petitions are con-
sistently rejected by the central government. Alternative methods 
and goals must be formulated. It is under these circumstances 
that terrorist splinter groups emerge offering drastic solutions 
to the impasse . If demands are met, even in part, some form of 
cultural transformation (Stage 5) may take place. 
Stage 5: "cultural trans formation. " In the case of the nationalism 
of minority groups , this stage typically involves government reaction 
in the form of severe repressive measures which can lead to a tem~ 
porary moratorium on nationalist activities. In Brittany this was 
the pattern before and after World War II. But whether a true trans-
formation takes place, or a halt is called on overt activism, the 
cycle is ended until economic and social dislocations create the 
appropriate conditions under which old codes are rephrased, and new 
ideologies emerge. It is with reference to this continuity and the 
reshaping of f amiliar patterns within a repetitive cycle, that the 
term "permanent revolution" is so pertinent. 
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NOTES 
1 The case history presented here is developed from secondary mater-
ials which are often openly partisan. This obviously raises questions of 
bias, but materials of this kind reveal nationalist ideas and forms of 
behavior which are not likely to be recorded in more "neutral" sources. 
One should also keep in mind, though, that nationalist literature is apt 
to be heavily weighted in favor of the more dramatic aspects and events 
of the movement, and that consequently certain lacunae may be present in 
the current study. Essentially, this paper is an attempt to assemble as 
much data on the Breton nationalism as is available in published sources 
in the hope that tentative generalizations or hypotheses may arise for 
further testing. It is my intention to follow up this initial research 
with a program of field study in Brittany during the summers of 1971 
and 1972. 
2 While socio-economic reform was the major motivating force behind 
the syndicalist movement, there was more than a hint of less high-minded 
motivations. Wright (1964:18-20) suggests that large landlords with 
right-wing affiliations sought to enlist peasant support and thus preserve 
a sizeable bloc of voters against the inroads of republican ideology. 
3 The congress convened at Rosporden, July 1927. 
4 The Gorsedd of Bards, organized in 1901 as a society of Breton 
poets dedicated to the preservation of Celtic literary traditions, was 
modeled after the Gorsedd of CYMRU (Wales) (Ellis 1968:187). 
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5 For a detailed discussion of government and legislation dealing 
with agrarian reform see Wright (1964:162ff). 
6 The "artichoke revolution" was a protest against excessive whole":" 
sale prices charged by middlemen. It had the effect of demonstrating 
the power of organizational action. In May, 1961, farmers of south 
Brittany in the region of commercial potato growing protested low prices 
by dumping potatoes in town squares and burning ballot boxes to disrupt 
elections (Mallet 1962:8, 196; Caerleon 1969:74-76). 
7 For detailed discussion of the CELIB see Hayward (1969). 
8 Bleun-Brug pledged itself to fight for "the restoration of Christian 
Brittany with its cultural, artistic, folkloric and spiritual riches, 
under the banner of the Celtic crosslY (Caerleon 1969 :23ff). Congresses, 
language courses, scholastic and choral competitions were part of the 
total program to keep the Breton youth aware of their heritage. 
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